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I. INTRODUCTION
Cigarette-induced death and illness is one of the most important and costly
health problems facing society. Each year smoking kills 350,000 persons.' This
yearly death toll exceeds the total number of Americans killed in World War I,
the Korean War, and Vietnam.2 In comparison to other critical health
problems, AIDS has killed a total of 60,000 and heroin and cocaine each year
claim an estimated combined total of 10,000 persons.3 Recent studies show that
cigarettes are the leading cause of death from cancer in women.4
At present non-smokers pay a large portion of the health and welfare costs
of smoking-caused cancer through higher taxes and health insurance premi-
ums.5 Cigarette smoking costs the nation more than $52 billion annually in
* Professor of Law, Emory University; B.A., 1964, Washington and Jefferson College; J.D., 1967, Vanderbilt
University; LL.M., 1968, S.J.D, 1979. University of Wisconsin. I appreciate the valuable comments on a draft of
this paper, provided by Jennifer H. Arlen, Donald W. Fyr, Mel Gutterman, Margaret Howard. Howard 0.
Hunter, Harriet M. King. Edward J. Kionka, William T. Mayton, and Fred S. McChesney. Mistakes are mine,
however.
I. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
H. of Rep.. 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 99-167, at 4 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings]. Compare: "Experts say smoking kills
nearly 400,000 people in the United States each year .... " Atlanta J.-Const., May 13, 1990, at A-14. col. I. In
contrast. Elizabeth Whelan stated that smoking causes 350,000 deaths per year. E. WHELAN. A SMOKING GUN:
How THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY GETS AWAY WITH MURDER, 10 (1984).
2. Atlanta J.-Const., Feb. 21, 1987, at A-8, col. 1.
3. AIDS, Atlanta J.-Const., Aug. 15, 1989, at A-37, col. 4. Hearing on the Health Consequences of Smok-
ing: Nicotine Addiction Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce. H. of Rep., 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 100-68, at 23 (July 29. 1988) [hereinafter Nicotine Addiction].
4. A dramatic 44 percent increase in lung cancer deaths among women since 1979 is fueling a steady rise
in the country's deadliest form of cancer, federal health researchers [CDC] reported Thursday. Health
experts say the trend is a direct result of women's smoking habits .... [Tihe bad news is that lung
cancer is now the leading cause of cancer death in women. It has eclipsed breast cancer, and it is getting
worse."
Atlanta J.-Const., July 28, 1989. at A-I. col. I. "iT]hose who smoke two packs a day are seven times as
likely to suffer a heart attack as those who have never smoked." Atlanta J.-Const., Jan. 25, 1990. at A-I. col. I.
5. When a smoker contracts cancer, his or her medical expenses are often paid for by his or her health
insurance. These costs are in turn distributed among the other persons (non-smokers and smokers) with health
insurance. The non-smoker's rates are therefore higher because of the cancer expenses of the smoker.
If the smoker lacks health insurance, he or she will seek to obtain treatment at a public hospital. The costs of
this treatment are borne, in large part, by society in general.
The thought behind the absolute liability proposal is that since cigarettes are unique, not necessities and
cigarette-caused cancer is identifiable, the market system would work more efficiently if the costs of smoking-
caused cancer were born, as much as possible, by the cigarette manufacturers and smokers.
Elizabeth M. Whelan argues: "How can the economic burden of tobacco be shifted to where it belongs-on
the backs of smokers and tobacco producers? One frequently proposed solution is a 'health tax' on cigarettes, with
proceeds used to fund social welfare programs which pay for public medical costs of smoking." E. WHELAN, supra
note I, at 151. Of course, it is highly unlikely that Congress would pass such an act, therefore, the absolute
liability proposal rests upon creative decision-making by the courts.
Several scholars argue, however: "Although nonsmokers subsidize smokers' medical care and group life insur-
ance, smokers subsidize nonsmokers' pensions and nursing home payments. On balance, smokers probably pay
their way at the current level of excise taxes on cigarettes .... " Manning, Keeler, Newhouse. Sloss & Wasser-
man, The Taxes of Sin: Do Smokers Pay Their Way?, 1989 J. A.M.A. 1604 [hereinafter The Taxes of Sin].
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health care and lost productivity.6 The cigarette advertising industry spends ap-
proximately $250,000 per hour, every hour, day and night for product promo-
tion.' One result of this, if not the goal, is the acquisition of the smoking habit
by teenagers." Another problem that has surfaced is that cigarette smoking is
addictive-as addictive as heroin.' Young people, through advertising, are en-
ticed to smoke, become addicted, and as a result die in their prime from cancer.
With a $52 billion cost to society, addiction of children, and death to men and
women - at the peak of their productive lives-the time has come to examine
how the legal system deals with the costs of smoking.
This Article makes clear that because of problems with the present causes
of action, the costs of smoking rest upon the non-smoker as well as the smoker.
It argues for a reversal of this legal subsidy, shifting the costs to the cigarette
manufacturer and the smoker by means of absolute liability.
The most important contemporary suit against the cigarette manufacturers
is Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Philip Morris and Lorillard:
Rose Cipollone was born in 1925 and began to smoke in 1942. She smoked Chester-
field brand cigarettes . . . . [S]he stated that she smoked the Chesterfield brand to be
"glamorous," to "imitate" the "pretty girls and movie stars" depicted in Chesterfield
advertisements . . . . In 1981, Mrs. Cipollone was diagnosed as having lung cancer,
but even though her doctors advised her to stop smoking, she was unable to do so.
Mrs. Cipollone continued to smoke until June of 1982 when her lung was removed.
Even after that, she smoked occasionally, in secret. She testified that she was "ad-
dicted" to cigarette smoking . . . . Mrs. Cipollone died on October 21, 1984.10
Mr. and Mrs. Cipollone filed a complaint against several cigarette manu-
facturers in the federal district court on August 1, 1983.1' They sought dam-
ages resulting from Mrs. Cipollone's lung cancer. The promise of the Cipollone
case, and several others,"2 was that cigarette manufacturers would be taken to
trial and be required to pay for the damages caused by smoking. Indeed, the
In reply, cigarette excise taxes go into the general fund and do not help to reduce non-smokers' health insur-
ance costs, nor do they pay for treatment for smokers with cancer. The excise taxes do not encourage cigarette
manufacturers to market a safer cigarette nor to spend funds on research to cure cancer. Finally. since excise
taxes are not earmarked for cancer caused by smoking, they do not depict the true costs of smoking.
6. Atlanta J.-Const., Feb. 21, 1990, at A-7, col. 6.
7. Hearings, supra note I, at 2. Cipollone v. Liggett Group. Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1497 (D.N.J. 1988)
($2.3 billion divided by 8,760 hours = approximately $250,000 per hour).
8. "About 26 percent of people between ages 12 and 17 try smoking.... Those who smoke are lighting up
their first cigarette at the average age of 12." Atlanta J.-Const., May 17, 1990, at A-8, col. 3.
9. "Surgeon General C. Everett Koop announced unequivocally today that cigarettes and other tobacco
products are addictive like heroin and cocaine .... '" Atlanta J.-Const., May 16, 1988. at A-3, col. I.
"This Report shows conclusively that cigarettes and other forms of tobacco are addicting in the same sense as
are drugs such as heroin and cocaine." THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION. A
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL vi (1988) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL].
10. Cipllone v. Liggett Group, Inc.; Philip Morris, Inc.; Lorillard, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 548-51 (3d Cir.
1990).
I1. Id. at 552.
12. As of October, 1985, at least 240 cigarette and tobacco related cases had been filed. Note. Plaintiffs'
Conduct as a Defense to Claims Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 4 HARV. L. REV. 809, n.I (1986). In June of
1988, following the $400,000 Cipollone verdict, Atlanta attorney Guerry Thornton said: "I expect to see 300 to
500 new suits filed because of this." Atlanta J.-Const., June 19, 1988, at C-7, col. I.
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greater promise was that a wave of cigarette suits-as substantial as with asbes-
tos-would arise and compel a shift in the allocation of cigarette losses.
1 3
The reality of the Cipollone cases is more like a ripple on a pond. After
twelve Cipollone decisions, almost seven years of litigating, and a plaintiffs' ex-
penditure of perhaps $1.2 - $3 million, the cigarette manufacturers can still
boast that they have not paid a penny to a cancer plaintiff.1 4 The Cipollone case
demonstrates that the courts are far from a clear and coherent statement of
cigarette manufacturers' liability. No cause of action has emerged that will en-
able smokers to recover their damages and shift the losses from the public in
general to the shoulders of the smokers and the cigarette manufacturers. A re-
view of the causes of action considered in the Cipollone cases will manifest that
confusion abounds and more trials, appeals, and visits to the Supreme Court lie
ahead.15
More litigation and greater complexity in cigarette cases was guaranteed
when the federal court of appeals held in the Cipollone case that the Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965: "preempts those state law damage ac-
tions relating to smoking and health that challenge either the adequacy of the
warning on cigarette packages or the propriety of a party's actions with respect
to the advertising and promotion of cigarettes . ".. .,,6 On remand, the district
court interpreted the appellate decision as "preempting the plaintiff's failure to
warn, express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to de-
fraud claims to the extent that they sought to challenge the defendants' adver-
tising, promotional, and public relations activities after January 1, 1966. ''1 As
a result of these decisions, a cause of action might exist before 1966, but be
barred thereafter.
13. See. Edell, Cigarette Litigation: The Second Wave, 22 TORT & INS. Li. 90, 92 (1987).
Why then . . . has there been a new wave of cigarette litigation sweeping the country? One of the pri-
mary reasons is the substantial changes in the law of strict liability, comparative negligence, state of the
art, and other theories of liability. Another major factor is the approach taken by plaintiffs' counsel in the
prosecution of large, sophisticated toxic-tort litigation. No longer do we find sole practitioners trying these
cases, but rather larger firms with the financial, technical, and manpower resources necessary to go the
distance. Groups of law firms have joined together to litigate these cases collectively.
Id.
14. The court of appeals referred to ten Cipollone opinions plus the one in January equals eleven. Cipollone.
893 F.2d at 564. The January decision was stayed to allow the New Jersey Supreme Court to interpret the New
Jersey Products Liability Act. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 88-5732 (3d Cir. stay granted 3/2/90). The
Supreme court has granted certiorari in the Cipollone case. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.. 59 U.S.L.W. 3652
(U.S. Mar. 25. 1991) (cert. granted).
"[Marc Z.] Edell [a New Jersey attorney who has argued much of the Cipollone case] says his firm has spent
about S600.000 in out-of-pocket expenses and racked up about $2 million in billable time in the Cipollone litiga-
tion." Rust. Smoke Alarms, CAL LAW. 22. 25 (Oct. 1987). This statement is three years old, however.
"The tobacco industry proudly points to the fact that it has never paid a single dollar to a plaintiff for a
smoking-rclated illness .... " Note, Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers for Smoking Induced Illnesses and
Deaths. 18 RUTGERS LJ. 165 (1986) (quoting from the Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. I, 1985, at IA. col. I).
15. See Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 559-73.
16. Id. at 552.
17. Id. at 552-53. Other courts have reached the same result. See Rovsdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988). affg 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985); Palmer v. Liggett Group, 825 F.2d 620
(Ist Cir. 1987). rev'g 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986): Stephen v. American Brands, 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir.
1987) (per curiam); Semowich v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.. 1988 WL 86, 313 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). But cf. Forster
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691, 700-01 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (no preemption found absent
express statement from Congress).
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Five years after the filing of the Cipollone complaint:
[T]he case proceeded to trial on plaintiffs failure to warn, design defect, express
warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy claims . . . . On April 21,
1988, at the close of plaintiffs proofs, the district court struck the design defect claim
on the ground that plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence that defendants'
failure to market an alternatively designed cigarette . . . was a proximate cause of
Mrs. Cipollone's . . . death. [J]ury deliberations were limited to the fraudulent mis-
representation claim against each defendant, the conspiracy to defraud claim against
each defendant, the failure to warn claim against Liggett, and the express warranty
claim against Liggett.
After a four-month trial . . . the jury rejected the fraudulent misrepresentation
claims and the conspiracy to defraud claims . . . As to the failure to warn claim
against Liggett, the jury concluded that Liggett breached its duty to warn of the
health hazards of smoking before 1966 . . . . As to the express warranty claim, the
jury found that Liggett had breached an express warranty made to consumers. The
jury awarded Mr. Cipollone $400,000 to compensate him for damages that he sus-
tained from Liggett's breach of warranty; the jury awarded Mrs. Cipollone's estate no
damages on the breach of warranty claim. 18
In January, 1990, the Court of Appeals reversed portions of the District
Court's decision and remanded the Cipollone case for a new trial.19 Part of the
January decision favors the Cipollones (both now dead) and part favors the
cigarette manufacturers. In regard to comparative fault, the court held that
"Mrs. Cipollone's post-1965 conduct should have been considered as relevant to
avoidable consequences, possibly reducing her damages but not foreclosing lia-
bility. ' ' 20 In responding to Liggett's claimed errors in regard to failure to warn,
the court held that there was no basis for holding as a matter of law that Lig-
gett was under no duty to warn of the dangers of cigarettes because their dan-
gers were commonly understood. 1 The court stated in dealing with the U.C.C.
express warranty claim: "We hold that once the buyer has become aware of the
affirmation of fact or promise, the statements are presumed to be part of the
'basis of the bargain' unless the defendant, by 'clear affirmative proof,' shows
that the buyer knew that the affirmation of the fact was untrue. 22
The appellate court in Cipollone was also faced with the issue of whether
comparative fault was available in an express warranty action. It held that
a comparative fault defense is available in an express warranty action, but only to the
extent that the defendant can show that the buyer misused or abused the product or
used the product after learning that the warranty was false. . . . Liggett must be
given the opportunity at the outset [of the new trial] to prove that at some point prior
to January 1, 1966, Mrs. Cipollone ceased to believe or never believed, Liggett's
advertisements.
23
The appellate court also held that the express warranty claim could rest upon
the cigarette advertisements submitted to the jury. The evidence (advertise-
18. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 553-55.
19. Id. at 583.
20. Id. at 558.
21. Id. at 559.
22. Id. at 568.
23. Id. at 573-74.
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ments) "compellingly points to an express warranty . . by means of various
advertising media, not only repeatedly assured [the consumer] that smoking
Chesterfields was absolutely harmless, but in addition the jury could very well
have concluded that there were express assurances of no harmful effect on the
lungs.24
The District Court had ruled that the recently amended (1987) New
Jersey Products Liability Act functioned to bar the Cipollone's risk-utility
claim. 25 The Act provides that when a person asserts a design defect claim
against a manufacturer, the manufacturer shall not be liable if:
The characteristics of the product are known to the ordinary consumer or user,
and the harm was caused by an unsafe aspect of the product that is an inherent char-
acteristic of the product and that would be recognized by the ordinary person who uses
or consumes the product ....26
The Court of Appeals rejected the application of the statute in the Cipol-
lone case: "We do not believe that [the Act] was a codification of existing com-
mon law . . ,,"2 It then went on to reject the notion that the harms from
smoking were obvious before 1966: "[W]e cannot find . . . there was sufficient
evidence for the district court to find, that the 'inherent[ly] [dangerous] charac-
teristic[s]' of cigarettes were known to the 'ordinary consumer or user,' prior to
1966. This is an issue of fact for the jury. '28
On appeal Mr. Cipollone also alleged that the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act did not preempt his post-1965 intentional tort claims. The
court disagreed:
Plaintiff's intentional tort claim is founded on an allegation that defendants "in-
tentionally . . . through their advertising, attempted to neutralize the [federally man-
dated] warnings that were given regarding the adverse effects of cigarette smoking."
* * The plaintiff's claim manifestly "challenge[s] ...the propriety" of the defend-
ants' "actions with respect to the advertising and promotion of cigarettes." . . . The
district court did not err in construing our preemption decision [against the
plaintiff] .29
Although the courts have labored hard at the oars, after seven years of
litigation and over eleven reported Cipollone decisions, cigarette plaintiffs have
not yet recovered a penny. They may be no closer to a victory than they were
thirty-seven years ago.30 In the January 1990 concurring opinion in Cipollone,
Chief Judge Gibbons wrote: "[T]here will now be a new trial, and a new ap-
24. Id. at 576.
25. Id. at 577.
26. Id. The Court of Appeals has recently stayed the application of its January 5 opinion in the Cipollone
case pending a New Jersey Supreme Court ruling on the states products liability statute. "The New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision in Dewey v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco. . .is expected to answer. ..whether the
legislature intended the new law to be applied retroactively or only prospectively." Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. 237
(BNA) (March 9, 1990).
27. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 578. The Act was amended in 1987.
28. Id. at 578.
29. Id. at 582.
30. "The first wave of lawsuits brought against cigarette manufacturers began in 1954. These cases were
unsuccessful. . . . It is apparent that the legal theories of recovery employed in these earlier cases limited their
likelihood of success and provided the defendants with the opportunity to utilize procedural tactics that depleted
plaintiffs' resources ...." Edell, supra note 13. at 90.
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peal, and the Supreme Court may still tell the parties . . . they should try
again." 31
The anticipated march of new cigarette cases has come to a halt.3 2 Indeed,
the Cipollone line of cases clearly demonstrates that there is a need for a sim-
pler and more efficient cause of action in dealing with cigarette cancer. The
proposal responds to this need by arguing for the adoption of absolute liability
for cancer caused by smoking. The goal of the proposal is to reallocate the loss,
from non-smokers and society in general, to the cigarette manufacturers and
smokers.
Part II of this Article presents the history, social policy, and economic the-
ory supporting the absolute liability cause of action, Part III explains the abso-
lute liability proposal as applied to cigarette manufacturers. Parts IV and V
suggest the need for a change in cause-in-fact for cigarette litigation.
II. THE HISTORY, POLICY, AND ECONOMICS OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY AS
APPLIED TO CIGARETTE MANUFACTURERS
Under the theory of absolute liability, an injurer is liable if he causes dam-
age.3 3 There is no defense except the absence of causation. 34 In one of the earli-
est recorded torts cases (1466), the defendant was held liable on the basis of
absolute liability:
[I]f a man does a thing he is bound to do it in such a manner that by his deed no
injury or damage is inflicted upon others. . . . [I]f a man commits an assault upon me
and I cannot avoid him, if he wants to beat me, and I lift my stick in self-defense in
order to prevent him, and there is a man in back of me, and I injure him in lifting my
stick, in that case he would have an action against me . . .3
Absolute liability is different from strict liability. In both strict liability
related to land (referred to as abnormally dangerous activities by the American
31. Cipollone. 893 F.2d at 583. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the Cipollone case. Cipollone v.
Liggett Group. Inc., 59 U.S.L.W. 3652 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1991) (cert. granted). The Court will rule on the preemp-
tion question and perhaps other cigarette issues. Atlanta J.-Const., Mar. 25, 1991, at A-I. col. 4.
32.
lin most . . . instances a prima faie . . . case can be made against the manufacturers of cigarettes
.... With all these prima facie cases. . . one would expect there would be droves of lawyers signing up
these cases and filing them. One would be wrong. There are no droves of lawyers handling cigarette
disease cases; there is only a handful across the entire United States. The reality for most cigarette disease
victims and their families is that they cannot find a lawyer to handle their cases, no matter how hard they
look.
How can this be? People suffering from a cigarette disease often have viable claims with huge dam-
ages. Where are the lawyers? They are handling asbestos cases, DES cases. benzene cases . . . . They are
not handling cigarette disease cases and the reason why is simple: they cannot afford to. The cigarette
manufacturers, through a national team of lawyers, have adopted a uniform strategy of defense designed
to ensure that few lawyers can afford to take on a cigarette case, and that even fewer can see the case
through to trial. In short, by making the cost of litigation so high, the cigarette manufacturers have closed
the courthouse doors to most people ....
Townsley & Hanks. The Trial Court's Responsibility to Make Cigarette Disease Litigation Affordable and Fair.
25 CAL. W.L. REv. 275, 276-77 (1988).
33. See Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law of Torts. 31 LA. L.
REv. I. 3 (1970).
34. Id.
35. Anonymous, Y.B. 5 Edw. 4, f. 7, pl. 18 (K.B. 1466).
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Law Institute) and strict liability in regard to products, there is a balancing of
costs and benefits. For both of these forms of strict liability, defenses are availa-
ble, such as proximate cause and assumption of risk.3 For absolute liability,
however, the only defense is cause in fact.
The proposal is that cigarette manufacturers should be held liable on the
basis of absolute liability. We should "dust off" the "old" tort of absolute liabil-
ity: if a cigarette manufacturer causes injury (as defined in Parts III, IV, and
V), he is liable. The remainder of this part will be devoted to considering why a
cigarette manufacturer should be held absolutely liable for smoking-caused can-
cer from an historical view, a social policy view, and an economic view.
A. An Historical View of Absolute Liability
Tort law began with absolute liability. To suggest that cigarette manufac-
turers should be held absolutely liable is merely a return to the foundation of
civil liability. Professor Wex Malone makes clear that the basis of primordial
law was absolute liability resting upon causation:
[If at] your request I accompany you when you are about your own affairs; my ene-
mies fall upon and kill me, you must pay for my death. You take me to see a wild
beast show or that interesting spectacle, a mad man; beast or mad man kills me; you
must pay. You hang up your sword; someone else knocks it down so that it cuts me;
you must pay. In none of these cases can you honestly swear that you did nothing that
helped to bring about death or wound.37
Dean Prosser summarized tort law before 1850 as follows:
Writs in trespass were confined to forcible acts in breach of the King's peace. The writ
of trespass on the case developed out of a practice of applying to the Chancellor, in
cases where no writ could be found in the Register to cover the plaintiff's claim, for a
special writ, in the nature of trespass, drawn to fit the particular case.
: ..[I]n its earlier stages trespass was identified with the view that liability might be
imposed without regard to the defendant's fault .... 11
Professor Malone agrees that prior to about 1800, liability was absolute: "The
imposition of virtual no-fault liability in both Trespass and Trespass on the
Case in England continuously throughout the middle ages and, in fact, up until
the nineteenth century . . . reflected the ethical, social and economic needs of
the times . ... 39
Within the last twenty years, absolute liability has been applied to abnor-
mally dangerous activities such as blasting and in 1969, the New York Court of
Appeals in Spano v. Perini Corp. stated:
The concept of absolute liability in blasting cases is hardly a novel one. The over-
whelming majority of American jurisdictions have adopted such a rule. . . . Indeed,
this court itself, several years ago, noted that a change in our law would conform to
36. See W KEETON. D. DOBBS. R. KEETON. & D. OWEN. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs 710-
12 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
37. Malone. supra note 33, at I.
38. W. PROSSER. TORTS 2 (1976).
39. Malone. supra note 33. at 24.
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the more widely (indeed almost universally) approved doctrine that a blaster is abso-
lutely liable for any damages he causes, with or without trespass.
4 0
If absolute liability should apply to blasting because of the certain and
unpreventable damages, even more should it apply to the manufacturing of cig-
arettes with 350,000 smoking-caused deaths per year. As concluded in Spano:
"The question . . . was. . who should bear the cost of any resulting damage
.... 1$41 With cigarette-caused cancer, the question is also who should bear the
loss, non-smokers and society in general, or cigarette manufacturers and
smokers.
Apparently due to the high costs (for defendants) of absolute liability, the
concept of negligence emerged during the middle of the 1800s.42 The reason,
usually presented, for the development of negligence, was to subsidize the infant
industries in the United States.43 Professor Gregory explained the subsidy the-
ory as follows:
The foregoing account shows that the principle eliminating the unintended trespass as
a substantive tort and establishing a consistent theory of liability based on fault was
developed to confer on industrial enterprise an immunity from liability for accidental
harms to others. Apparently, the idea was to tax enterprise with the cost of only those
damages avoidably caused.
4
Professor Horwitz is more forceful: "[C]ommon law doctrines appeared to pre-
sent a major cost barrier to social change . . . . Under the pressure of damage
judgments, American courts before the Civil War began to change legal rules in
order to subsidize the activities of great works of public improvement . 'fac-
tories, machinery, dams, canals and railroads.' ,,45
In the mid-1800s, there were, perhaps, good reasons for subsidizing the
railroads and young industries, but today, there are few reasons for the legal
system to continue a subsidy for the tobacco industry.46 Rather than subsidizing
the tobacco industry, the industry should be absolutely liable. As negligence has
been replaced by strict liability in certain areas, 47 the tobacco manufacturers
should be subject to absolute liability in order to afford them the opportunity to
pay their own way.48 The thrust of the negligence action is to place the parties
in the courtroom on an equal footing.49 The impact of the assumption of risk
and the cause-in-fact defense, in cigarette litigation, is that the smoker is going
to lose, in part because of inadequate financial resources.50 He cannot compete
40. Spano v. Perini, 25 N.Y.2d II, 15, 250 N.E.2d 31, 33, 302 N.Y.S.2d 527, 530 (1969).
41. Id. at 17, 250 N.E.2d at 34, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 530.
42. See M. HORWITZ. THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 70-71 (1977).
43. Id.
44. Gregory, Trespass To Negligence To Absolute Liability. 37 VA. L. REv. 359, 382 (1951).
45. M. HORWITZ, supra note 42, at 70-71 (quoting Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 486, 484 (1873)).
46. The idea behind an economic subsidy is to support an industry until it is able to mature, to stand on its
own. Tobacco long ago reached that level of economic maturity. Today it is able to pay its own way-including
damages. The need for a legal and therefore economic subsidization of the tobacco industry (if it ever existed) has
long passed.
47. Products liability is perhaps the most obvious example.
48. The price of the product should represent not merely labor and materials, but also the damages caused by
the product.
49. Vandall, Judge Posner's Negligence-Efficiency Theory: A Critique, 35 EMORY L.J. 405 (1986).
50. See Townsley & Hanks, supra note 32, at 277.
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in the legal arena.5 The smoker (and his or her family) will lose the case, not
because it is unjust, but because the smoker is not financially equipped to com-
pete in discovery and at trial.5 2
Since 1849 there have been numerous legal developments (comparable to
the absolute liability I am proposing) that make it easier for an injured person
to win in tort: strict liability, res ipsa loquitur, negligence per se, and a deterio-
ration of immunities.5 3 Strict liability does not require the plaintiff to prove
negligence and is based on the theory that the loss should rest upon the seller.54
At first blush, strict liability appears designed for cigarette plaintiffs. All ciga-
rette-cancer cases have failed, however, including those resting on strict
liability.55
The concepts of res ipsa loquitur"8 and negligence per se57 reflect the un-
derpinnings of absolute liability and have furthered an expansion of liability.58
Professor Gregory argued:
For years there have been some American precedents openly embracing the doctrine
of [absolute liability] as part of our common law. But most of our state courts have
been more cautious; and if they have achieved what seems like absolute liability, they
have done it under some category of negligence. As indicated above, res ipsa loquitur
was their normal recourse, in such instances.59
The theory of negligence per se is that if a person violates a regulation or an
ordinance (state or federal), the court may decide that this is evidence of negli-
gence."' In truth, it is unlikely that a cigarette manufacturer will be found in
violation of a statute. The reason is simple: these acts have often been drafted
expressly to protect the cigarette manufacturer."'
51. See id. at 275.
52. Id. at 277. The cigarette manufacturers have, to date, won the "second wave" of cases. In Tennessee, the
Roysdon case received a directed verdict by the district court because the plaintiff had failed to show that the R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. cigarettes were "defective or unreasonably dangerous." Atlanta J.-Const., Dec. 14, 1985, at
A-14, col. I.
The first trial in Horton v. American Tobacco Co. ended in a mistrial in January, 1988. after the jurors told
the judge they were hopelessly deadlocked. Trial was set for September 4, 1990. Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. 545
(BNA) (May 18. 1990).
As noted above, the S400,000 verdict in the Cipollone case has been reversed and a new trial is pending. See
Cipollone. 893 F.2d 541.
In Galbraith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 144417 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Barbara Co., Dec. 23, 1985).
the jury returned a verdict for R.J. Reynolds: "'Belli's client (who succumbed to congestive heart failure) wasn't
one or the thousands of individuals who clearly died from a cigarette-related disease. . [Tjhe Galbraith case
was not as 'clean medically' as others." Legal Times, Jan. 27, 1986, at 2. col. I.
53. See F. VANDALL. STRICT LIABILITY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 6-12 (1989).
54. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
55. Cipollone, 893 F.2d 541.
56. PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 36, at 242-62.
57. Id. at 229-31.
58. See Vandall, Applying Strict Liability to Pharmacists, 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 16-18 (1986).
59. Gregory, supra note 44. at 383.
60. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 36, at 229-31.
61. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, infra note 118, and the Consumer Product Safety Act. infra
note 120. both exclude tobacco products from their coverage. New Jersey, 15 PSLR 670, section 3(a)(2) and
California, Civil Code. section 1714.45(a)(I), have recently passed legislation that protects the cigarette
manufacturers.
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Historically, government, the family, and certain charitable institutions
have been protected from suit by strong defenses known as immunities. Re-
cently many of these immunities have been cast aside. This deterioration in
immunities, making it easier to sue and recover, has resulted in an expansion of
liability similar to the expansion proposed under absolute liability. As important
institutions (governments, families, charities) have become subject to liability
because of the removal of immunities, so should the activity of cigarette manu-
facturing lose its vast array of legal protections. Absolute liability is proposed as
a means of placing liability on cigarette manufacturers. Professor Schwartz
summarizes the deterioration of immunities:
Among the leading events within tort law during the past quarter-century has
been the abrogation of a variety of immunities that intruded into tort law late in the
nineteenth century and early in the twentieth. Thus, almost everywhere, the tort im-
munity of charitable institutions has been done away with. Intrafamilial immunities
increasingly have been discarded, rendering spouses liable to each other, parents liable
to their children, and vice versa. In addition, a broad, insensitive doctrine of govern-
mental immunity generally has been replaced by a carefully selected set of particular
immunity rules.6 2
With the expansion in tort liability over the last 140 years, aimed at making it
easier for an injured person to sue and recover, the insulation of the cigarette
industry is an anomaly. 8 Absolute liability is a means of ending this insulation.
B. The Social Policy Reasons for Applying Absolute Liability to Cigarette
Manufacturers
The reasons that have been embraced for the application of strict liability
to product sellers also support the extension of absolute liability to cigarette
manufacturers. These policy reasons run the full spectrum from reallocating the
loss, and the protection of health, through superior knowledge and economic
considerations.
1. Reallocating the Loss
The reasoning behind reallocating the loss is that the cigarette manufac-
turer is in a better position than the non-smoker and society in general to bear
the damages caused by smoking. Justice Traynor, in Escola v. Coca-Cola (con-
curring opinion) (1944), stated that liability in products cases should rest upon
absolute liability. He reasoned: "IT]he risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. It is
to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects
62. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability. 15 GA L. REV. 963, 964-65
(1981).
63. In contrast, the veil protecting the manufacturers of alcohol from suit has been pierced. Summary judg-
ment for the beer manufacturer was reversed in Hon v. Stroh, 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987). where the plaintiff
allegedly developed pancreatitis from beer consumption. Again the court in Brune v. Brown Forman Corp.. 758
S.W.2d 827 (Tex. App. 1988), reversed a summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer. The issue was whether
the manufacturer of tequila had a duty to warn a college student of the dangers of drinking straight shots of Pepe
Lopez Tequila. Joyce Brune died allegedly as a result of drinking tequila shooters.
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that are a menace to the public."6 The California Supreme Court, in Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., adopted the reasoning and holding that had
been foreshadowed in Escola. The court concluded: "The purpose of such liabil-
ity is to insure that the cost of injuries resulting from defective products are
borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than
by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." 6 This reason-
ing goes back at least to the 1913 case of Mazetti v. Armour: "The obligation
of the manufacturer should . . . rest . . . upon 'the demands of social justice.'
.. .Our holding is that . . . a manufacturer of food products under modern
conditions impliedly warrants his goods .... "66
The impact of absolute liability upon cigarette manufacturers is that they
will raise the price of their goods to cover losses. This will have the beneficial
effect of forcing the price of the product to reflect the damage caused. 67 Since
there will be many large cancer "claims" under absolute liability, and all ciga-
rette manufacturers will be subject to such "claims," the impact upon cigarette
manufacturers will be widespread and rather immediate. It is unlikely that one
manufacturer will have a competitive advantage over another under absolute
liability. Loss shifting will not put cigarette manufacturers at a disadvantage as
compared to other products. Smokers have few choices: pay the new, higher
price or quit.68 Few smokers will likely shift to smokeless tobacco 69 or pipes
because they are quite different activities. The reallocation of losses to cigarette
manufacturers will have two benefits: first, prices will rise and some people will
stop smoking; second, fewer cigarettes will be sold.7 0
64, Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-68, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (1944) (Tray-
nor. J.. concurring).
65. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63. 377 P.2d 897, 901. 27 Cal. Rptr. 695, 701
(1962).
66. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 627, 135 P. 633, 636 (1913).
67. There may be a possibility that shifting all of these cancer losses to the cigarette manufacturers will force
them into bankruptcy. If the cigarette manufacturers went bankrupt, large portions of the losses might then be
shifted back upon the non-smokers, smokers, and the public in general.
There are several replies to this. First, there is no data on how much loss the cigarette manufacturers could
absorb before being forced into bankruptcy. Judging from the billions of dollars per year that they spend on
promotions, their capacity to absorb losses may be enormous. Second, products liability suits are surgically pre-
cise. not bludgeons. In the Pinto gas tank case, the Pinto was removed from the market. Ford has continued to
prosper, however. Indeed, the "father of the Pinto," Lee lacocca, seems to be doing quite well. Finally. a "golden
goose" approach would likely be employed by the bankruptcy court. A separate trust would be created by the
court and funded by the cigarette manufacturers. The level of funding would guarantee fair payments to injured
smokers but would not kill the "golden goose," the cigarette manufacturers. See Atlanta J.-Const., June 26. 1990,
at E-1. col. 2.
68. Some smokers, rather than pay the higher prices, may grow their own tobacco and roll their own ciga-
rettes, to be sure.
69. See Note, Product Liability for Smokeless Tobacco: Should Tobacco Companies be Liable for a Failure
to Warn?. 21 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 768-71 (1987).
70. Compare:
The available clinical and research data suggest that the demand for cocaine is relatively elastic among
the great majority of consumers who are occasional or recreational users. . . . Price increases will reduce
the quantity demanded, while price decreases should have the opposite effect. On the other hand . ..
addicts represent inelastic demand. Addicts are less likely than nonaddicts to be responsive, to changes in
price in setting their demand for cocaine.
Cloud. Cocaine. Demand and Addiction: A Study of the Possible Convergence of Rational Theory and National
Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 725, 762-63 (1989).
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There have been several estimates as to how much the price of cigarettes
will increase if manufacturers are subject to liability. Marcia Stein reports:
"One Wall Street analyst has estimated that if the tobacco industry was forced
to pay $100,000 to each of 65,000 claimants per year, the price of a pack of
cigarettes would rise only 22 cents.""1 Professor Tribe, however, estimates: "If
smokers win, cigarette makers may be held accountable for an estimated $80
billion a year in smoking-related losses; cigarette prices may shoot up to $3 a
pack."172
2. Health Protection
A fundamental reason for applying absolute liability to cigarette manufac-
turers is to protect life and health.73 The theory is that, if the manufacturer is
subject to absolute liability, he will exercise a high degree of care in order to
avoid liability. Critics might respond by saying that a cigarette will always be
lethal. However, we do not know the extent to which a cigarette can be made
safe. We may have seen the light of a safer cigarette in the paladium example.7 4
Perhaps it will be possible for the cigarette manufacturers to develop a cigarette
that does not cause cancer or a form of nicotine that is not addicting.75 At
present, society has no clue as to how safe a cigarette might become. If it is
accurate to state that holding manufacturers liable has made numerous prod-
ucts safer, such as automobiles,76 airplanes, 77 and vaporizers,7 8 then it makes
sense to conclude that absolute liability will also encourage manufacturers to
develop safer cigarettes.
3. Superior Knowledge
The third reason for holding a cigarette manufacturer absolutely liable is
that he is an expert in regard to cigarettes. The courts have indicated that be-
cause of superior knowledge it is appropriate to hold the manufacturer liable as
compared to the consumer.79 This is especially true in regard to cigarettes. The
average smoker is not well educated and is not at the top of the income ladder.80
71. Legal Attack on Tobacco Flares, American Medical News, Sept. 20, 1985. at 49, col. 2. quoted in Stein,
Cigarette Products Liability Law in Transition, 54 TENN. L. REv. 650 n.126 (1987).
72. Tribe, Federalism With Smoke and Mirrors, The Nation 788 (June 7, 1986).
73. The application of absolute liability to cigarette manufacturers will force them to invest in research for a
safer cigarette. It may also encourage them to seek a "cure" for cigarette-induced cancer. If a "cure" were
discovered that was cheap and effective, the cigarette manufacturers could greatly reduce the number of cancer-
related damage suits. This discovery would, of course, be of great value to all of society.
74. The "safer" palladium cigarette would reduce the risk of lung cancer by 8-17%. Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1493 (D.N.J. 1988).
75. Current studies suggest that nicotine is the addictive substance in tobacco. REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL, supra note 9. at i.
76. See Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App., 1974).
77. See McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1978).
78. See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co.. 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
79. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
80.
[B]lacks. teenage girls and people with a high school education or less continue to pick up the habit ..
[T]he national Centers for Disease Control (CDC) said about 1.5 million Americans-mostly white, well-
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He or she is not likely to realize that cigarettes are as addictive as heroin81 and
that cigarettes kill "more than the combined death tolls from alcohol, illegal
drugs, traffic accidents, suicide, and homicide . -." He or she is not likely to
realize that each year cigarettes kill more than the total combined American
battle deaths in World War II and Vietnam,83 nor that smoking causes cancer
of the lungs, larynx, oral cavity, and esophagus, as well as heart disease.84 Al-
though the smoker may have heard in jest of "coffin nails," '85 he or she may not
realize that the statement is true. Absolute liability allows society to hold the
cigarette manufacturer to the knowledge of these things as an expert. Held to
this level of knowledge, the cigarette manufacturer will take appropriate action
in regard to safety. Often the smoker is addicted and is not in a position to
make a rational choice.88
4. The Cheapest Cost Avoider
Dean Calabresi has developed a unique test for strict liability. His goal is
to reduce the amount spent on the entire legal system because of "a desire to
accomplish better primary accident cost reduction. 1 7 In order to reach this
goal, he proposes a test that rejects both negligence and traditional strict
liability:
The strict liability test we suggest does not require that a government institution
make such a cost-benefit analysis. It requires of such an institution only a decision as
to which of the parties to the accident is in the best position to make the cost-benefit
analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on that deci-
sion once it is made. The question for the court reduces to a search for the cheapest
cost avoider.88
If we ask who is the cheapest cost avoider between the smoker and the
cigarette manufacturer, it seems that the answer will always be the manufac-
turer. He has the assets, the experience, the knowledge, and the ability to com-
pile data, and to test and make changes in the product. He is not addicted.
5. Economic Analysis
In terms of economic efficiency, it would seem that if we are going to per-
mit the losses brought on by smoking, its impact should be isolated to those
directly involved. We should create a closed system in which the costs of smok-
educated adults-kick the habit each year, but at least a million others-predominantly teenagers and
women with less than a college education-join the ranks of smokers. . . . The researchers said smoking
habits have changed ... from a widespread practice among all segments of American society to an
addiction of poorly educated and low-income people .
Atlanta J.-Const., Jan. 6, 1989, at A-3, col. 4.
81. REPORT OF TIlE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 9. at iv-v.
82. Atlanta J.-Const., Feb. 21. 1987. at A-8, col. I.
83. Id.
84. Hearings, supra note I. at 338-40.
85. See R. MILES. COFFIN NAILS AND CORPORATE STRATEGIES 30-53 (1982).
86. See REPORT OF TIlE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 9. at i. But see Schwartz. infra note 99, at 521-22.
87. Calabresi & Hischoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE LU. 1055, 1075 (1972).
88. Id. at 1060.
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ing are born solely by cigarette manufacturers and smokers. The costs of smok-
ing should be internalized. The price of cigarettes should reflect the damages
caused.89 Absolute liability would help to accomplish this.
Today, the problem is that the costs of smoking are paid for by non-smok-
ers as well as smokers.90 This occurs in two ways. First, if a smoker has insur-
ance, he or she recovers from his insurance carrier for his or her medical ex-
penses.9 ' These expenses are in turn spread among the other smoking and non-
smoking policy holders.92 The result is that non-smokers, through increased
health insurance costs, bear much of the costs for the smoker's "freedom" to
smoke. A closed system would be accomplished by forcing cigarette manufac-
turers to pay for smoking-caused damages. The manufacturer would, in turn,
pass on the costs by raising prices. The smoker would pay for his own treatment
through the higher cigarette costs. The system would be closed and non-smokers
would no longer shoulder many of the costs of smoking.
Second, if the smoker lacks insurance or exhausts his insurance and other
assets, he will turn to welfare. 9' The result is that the costs of smoking are then
spread among the non-smoking (and smoking) public. Economically this is dis-
advantageous because it conceals the real costs of smoking from the smoker and
from the public. That is, cigarettes are inexpensive because manufacturers do
not have to pay damages. These costs are covertly spread among the non-smok-
ing public. Since cigarettes are a discrete product (they are not necessities, nor
are they building blocks-like steel), it would make more sense to place the loss
on the manufacturers and allow the price of cigarettes to rise and reflect the
actual costs.
Some argue that because of heavy taxes, cigarettes pay their own way.9 4
These taxes flow into a general fund and are not earmarked for smokers' inju-
89. See Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. I (1980); A. POLINSKY. AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 98 (1983).
On the other hand, cigarettes contain all of the elements necessary to be banned by the Consumer Product
Safety Commission. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2061, 2064 (1990). The CPSC expressly lacks
jurisdiction over tobacco products, of course. See supra note 61.
Three wheel all-terrain vehicles were recently banned. See United States v. Polaris Indus., No. 87-3525
(D.D.C. Dec. 30. 1987) (1987 WL 33507).
90. In terms of health insurance contracts, it may be argued that the non-smoker has no basis to complain.
He knew the price of the insurance when he purchased it. He can not now complain because part of that price
includes the coverage of smokers' cancer. However, in terms of efficiency, Shavell and Polinsky argue that the
price of a product should reflect the damages it causes. Spreading the losses to non-smokers masks the true cost of
smoking. See supra note 89.
Another reply to the contract argument is that placing the loss on the cigarette manufacturers has a strong
deterence function. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). They
will seek means to reduce damages.
Of course, some of the benefits from the taxes on tobacco products accrue to non-smokers. See The Taxes of
Sin, supra note 5, at 1604; E. WHELAN, supra note I, at 150.
91. Examples of such insurance would be Blue Cross/Blue Shield and health maintenance organizations.
92. Expenses for cigarette cancer are treated like other payments and spread among all of the policy holders.
See E. WHELAN, supra note 1. at 150.
93. Id.
94. "Although nonsmokers subsidize smoker's medical care and group life insurance, smokers subsidize non-
smokers pensions and nursing home payments. On balance, smokers probably pay their way at the current level of
excise taxes on cigarettes." The Taxes of Sin, supra note 5, at 1604.
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ries, however. 5 To be sure, these funds are not available to injured smokers who
do not make welfare claims. They do not affect smokers' insurance claims. By
not being earmarked for smokers' health care expenses, these taxes help to con-
ceal the true costs of smoking.
6. Other Considerations
As a nation we are concerned with cocaine and heroin, which kill less than
10,000 people per year,96 but we accept the widespread marketing and advertis-
ing of a drug that kills 350,000 people per year. Toward whom is cigarette
marketing directed? The answer is clear: children.9 7 Cigarette marketing is say-
ing to insecure teenagers, "we have the solution to your insecurity and aliena-
tion problems: smoke." These ads are successful. Perhaps the most visible exam-
ple is automobile racing which appeals to young people. Winston sponsors a
series of NASCAR races and their logo appears at every turn. In like fashion,
Marlboro is well entrenched in formula-one racing. Most people who smoke
began at ages eleven, twelve, or thirteen.98 By contrast, few adults experiment
with cigarettes.
Cigarettes are addictive! The 1988 Surgeon General's report stated:
Careful examination of the data makes it clear that cigarettes and other forms of
tobacco are addicting. An extensive body of research has shown that nicotine is the
drug in tobacco that causes addiction. Moreover, the processes that determine tobacco
addiction are similar to those that determine addiction to drugs such as heroin and
cocaine. 99
95. "[T~he amount of revenue obtained from these taxes [state and federal excise taxes on cigarettes] is
woefully inadequate to cover the cost of smoking. If cigarette smoking provides any economic 'benefit' to the
general population, it does so by reducing Social Security payouts to smokers who die prematurely." E. WHELAN,
supra note I. at 150.
96. See Nicotine Addiction, supra note 3, at 23.
97. See DiFranza & Tye, Who Profits From Tobacco Sales to Children?, 263 J. A.M.A. 2784 (1990).
The billboard depicts a longlegged swimsuit-clad woman lolling under a crystal-clear waterfall. No ciga-
rette package. No cigarette. No smoke. Only the slogan, "The Refreshest," and a brilliant green Salem
logo. . . . Synar, backed by many anti-smoking groups, wants the ads out of magazines, newspapers and
sports stadiums, and off race cars and billboards. . . . Ban [a cigarette advertising ban] advocates argue
that all advertising should be eliminated because it induces youngsters to smoke, rather than propels
smokers to switch brands, as the cigarette companies argue.
Atlanta J.-Const., July 3, 1988, at D-I, col. 2.
98.
Ads portraying the cigarettes as a sign of adulthood were obviously designed to attract young people to
the habit. For example, American Tobacco began advertising in 1962 that, "Smoking is a Pleasure Meant
for Adults," but added, "Lucky Strikes Separate the Men from the Boys . . . but not from the Girls,"
which is just what the young boy trying to "prove" he was a man wanted to hear. The tobacco industry's
contention that it wasn't trying to attract new smokers made no business sense at all.
E. WHELAN. supra note 1, at 113. "The government estimates that 3,000 teenagers become regular smokers each
day - and 90 percent of all smokers start the habit as teenagers." Atlanta J.-Const., June 1, 1990, at E-l, col. 2.
A solution would be for Congress to "ban" most forms of cigarette advertisements and for the courts to adopt
the absolute liability proposal. The "ban" would provide billions of dollars to pay the damages in the suits based
on absolute liability. See Atlanta J.-Const., July 15, 1990. at G-1, col. I.
99. REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 9, at iii (1988).
Most smokers want to quit, but the task can be so daunting that surprisingly few try, fewer succeed and
even fewer seek any help to stop. ...
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What this means is that children try smoking and become addicted.100 Cig-
arette marketing is aimed at the teen and pre-teen market, and their aim is
accurate. If a free-market system must permit such youth addiction, the costs
should be borne by the manufacturer. Children under the age of 18 generally
cannot contract,101 but yet, as a society, we support a $250,000 per hour 02 ad-
vertising expenditure that has as a goal the addiction of children who are too
young to contract for an automobile, a house, or a boat.
Cigarette smoking has little social benefit. 03 When courts talk about strict
liability and negligence, they often say that whether there should be liability
depends on whether the costs of avoiding the activity exceed the benefit of the
activity. For example, Judge Learned Hand, in Carroll Towing stated:
[T]he owners duty . . . to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three
variables: (1) the probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting
injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. . . . [I]f the probability be
During the 1980's about 17.3 million have tried to quit for at least a day each year, but only 1.3
million stay off for a year or more. Of those, about 40 percent relapse in two to 10 years, and half of those
never try to quit again.
Atlanta J.-Const., July 25, 1989, at C-I, col. 1.
Schwartz argues that cigarettes are not addictive: "[A]llegedly addictive substances such as tobacco and
alcohol do not generate physical withdrawal costs that are so high as to overcome the will of an ordinary person to
discontinue use when she comes to believe that the costs of consuming exceed the benefits." Schwartz, Views of
Addiction and the Duty to Warn, 75 VA. L. REv. 509, 521-22 (1989).
100. Nicotine Addiction, supra note 3, at 2-3.
101. The contract is not void but voidable on the part of the minor. See H. HUNTER, 2 MODERN LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 14.10[i] (1987).
102. See supra note 7.
NASCAR officials are circling the wagons. Dependent on the S55 million annually pumped into their
sport by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., and with many race teams backed by smokeless tobacco companies,
NASCAR is about to begin a counterattack against recent government efforts to rid sports of tobacco
sponsorship.
Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services, started the furor Feb. 23 . . .when he
called for an end to tobacco company sponsorship of sporting events.
"This blood money should not be used to foster a misleading impression that smoking is compatible
with good health," Sullivan said at a news conference.
Atlanta J.-Const., Mar. 17, 1990, at C-I, col. 4.
103. An argument can be made that cigarettes have substantial social utility because the cigarette manufac-
turers donate millions to the arts and to academic research.
An early Cipollone case put that line of reasoning to rest, however: Evidence of the benefits of cigarette
production to the tobacco industry, the Internal Revenue Service, a manufacturer's stockholders and employees,
and to society at large was irrelevant and inadmissible in an action to recover from a cigarette manufacturer for
the death from cancer of a consumer who smoked. Under a risk-utility analysis, the risk to the consumer could not
be measured against the benefit to society as a test of a product's defectiveness. In order to be admissible the
evidence must show that the benefit to the individual consumer outweighed the risks.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 644 F. Supp. 283, 290 (D.N.J. 1986).
To admit into evidence all of the jobs created by the activity and the donations made by the sellers would
suggest that selling cocaine is a socially beneficial activity. The response to this is that selling cocaine is illegal and
therefore different from cigarettes. But in torts cases, legislative standards (legality) have never been the test for
whether an act is negligent or a product defective. See Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61. 65, 577 P.2d
1322, 1325 (1978). Generally the statutory standard is only evidence of due care. Id.
Smokers would likely argue that there is psychological satisfaction in smoking and that it is a response to
peer group pressure. If smoking were not so lethal, this argument might have some merit. Peer group pressure is
an acceptable reason for trying a hoola-hoop or trying to water ski. It is not an acceptable reason for playing
Russian roulette.
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called P; the injury L; and the burden B; liability depends upon whether B is less than
L multiplied by P; i.e., whether B is less than PL.04
Similarly the 1978 case of Barker v. Lull concludes:
We hold that a trial judge may properly instruct the jury that a product is defec-
tive in design . . . if the plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused
his injury and the defendant fails to prove . . . that on balance the benefits of the
challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.105
This is often a challenging question in cases involving automobiles, 0 8 air-
planes,10 7 and forklifts'08 because the social benefit of the product is substantial.
This is an easy question for cigarettes, however, because they have no beneficial
use. The myth is that smoking is relaxing and helps the smoker to concen-
trate.' Actually, smoking merely relieves the tension produced by the addic-
tion to nicotine."10 If the smoker did not smoke, he or she would not be addicted
to nicotine, would not be tense, and would not need a cigarette to relax.
For those who argue that smoking keeps them slim, new research shows
that it only keeps off five to ten pounds on the average."' There are safer ways
to lose weight.
We subsidize the manufacture and sale of cigarettes in order to protect the
jobs of large numbers of tobacco farmers and manufacturers."' With this in
mind, Whelan, nevertheless, concludes that the costs of smoking exceed the ben-
efits by over $17 billion:
According to 1978 estimates, smoking accounts for nearly 8 percent of all direct
health care costs and over 11 percent of the total direct and indirect cost of disease in
the United States ...
. . [C]igarette-related diseases are responsible for more than $11 billion per year in
medical expenses and $36 billion in lost productivity ...
These figures do not take into account the indirect impact on families, employers,
friends, community, etc., or the multiplier effects of lost incomes."'
Whelan suggests that cigarettes may only contribute $29.2 billion to the econ-
omy: "[T]otal domestic sales are over $20 billion per year. . . . Exports bring in
another $2.2 billion per year. Federal, state and municipal revenues from excise
104. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169. 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
105. Barker v. Lull Eng'g. Co.. 20 Cal. 3d 413. 432, 574 P.2d 443, 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237-38
(1978).
106. See Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
107. See McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 174 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1978).
108. See Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 574 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
109. "Beyond the physical addiction, there is the social-psychological dependence on the smoking habit. For
many smokers, the behavior modification needed to stop smoking presents more of a barrier than the physical
addiction. (For example, many people who give up smoking 'don't know what to do' with their hands.)" E. WHE-
LAN. supra note I, at 2.
110. See REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 9, at iv. Peer pressure and psychological addiction
cannot be dismissed of course. "A substantial part of the 'enjoyment' [from smoking] that ... occurs comes from
releasing the 'tension' caused by the gnawing, cigarette induced desire." White, Strict Liability of Cigarette Man-
ufacturers and Assumption of Risk. 29 LA, L. REv. 596 (1969).
11l. "Smokers on average weigh five to 10 pounds less than non-smokers." Atlanta J.-Const., Apr. 6. 1989,
at A-10. col. 5.
112. See E WHELAN. supra note I, at 147-48. See also White, supra note I10, at 592-94.
113. See E WHELAN, supra note 1, at 146-47.
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and sales taxes on tobacco products amounted to over $7 billion in 1981." 1",
Such a conclusion is speculative and Whelan admits: "No economist has ever
attempted a comprehensive and complete assessment of tobacco's effect on the
U.S. economy, including both the costs related to tobacco-induced disease and
its contribution to the Gross National Product. . ."15 In short, the costs of
smoking exceed its benefits. Tobacco causes more death and destruction than it
produces in GNP.
Three-wheel All Terrain Vehicles (ATVs) have some utility in that they
are fun to ride, can be used to check large parking lots, and to patrol fences and
pipe lines; however, they have caused hundreds of deaths since 1982.116 Because
of these losses, three-wheeled ATVs have been banned from sale in the United
States.117 If ATVs have some utility and have only caused a total of 1600
deaths, should we not consider the application of absolute liability to the manu-
facture and sale of cigarettes that kill 350,000 persons yearly?
Help in dealing with the cigarette problem is unlikely to come from Con-
gress. Most legislation has worked to insulate and protect the cigarette manu-
facturers. This is also likely to be true in the future. Under the Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act, a drug is defined as: "(B) articles intended for use in the diag-
nosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man . . .; (C)
articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body of man. .. .*"18 Under this definition, it is clear that cigarettes are strong
drugs. They adversely affect the oral cavity, lungs, heart, and kidney, for exam-
ple. One would expect cigarettes to be regulated by the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act (FDA). This is a faulty assumption, however. A court has re-
jected the regulation of cigarettes as "drugs" under the Act:
The court granted summary judgment against an anti-smoking group's effort to
force the F.D.A. to regulate cigarettes. The court agreed with the Commissioner's
view that the statutory definition included "only those cigarettes for which therapeutic
claims have been made," emphasizing that "[t]he 'intent' element of the definition of
drug, when applied to cigarettes, has always been construed as that of the vendor."' 19
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) was implemented to
protect the consumer from injurious products.2 0 However, the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Act carefully excludes tobacco from the province of the agency:
"The term 'consumer product' . does not include-(B) tobacco and tobacco
products.""'
In regard to Congress, we have seen the avoidance of serious attempts to
protect the consumer from the hazards of cigarette smoking. 12 2 Clearly, no
114. Id. at 149.
115. Id.
116. See United States v. Polaris Indus., No. 87-3525 (D.D.C. Dec. 30. 1987) (1987 WL 33507).
117. See id.
118. 21 U.S.C.A. § 432(h)(2) (Supp. 1969).
119. Action on Smoking & Health v. Califano, Food Drug Cos. L. Rep. CCH 38,219 (D.D.C. 1979).
120. See The Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051(a)(3) (1990).
121. Id. at § 2052(a)(1).
122. See E. WHELAN supra note 1, at 106-08. The pressure from cigarette manufacturers is often not subtle:
"Tobacco companies have contributed more than $1 million to Sen. Jesse Helm's political campaigns and built a
museum in his honor." Atlanta J.-Const., July 2. 1990, at A-4, col. 5.
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meaningful legislation that encroaches upon cigarette manufacturing or sales
will come out of Congress. Professor Macey provides an explanation for this:
According to the so-called interest group or economic theory of legislation, mar-
ket forces provide strong incentives for politicians to enact laws that serve private
rather than public interests, and hence statutes are supplied by lawmakers to the polit-
ical groups or coalitions that outbid competing groups. The wide-spread acceptance of
interest group theory has led to suspicion about much of what Congress does, creating,
in turn, a climate hospitable to judicial interference with legislative outcomes.12
An exception to this is the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of
1965.124 Today, as modified, that Act provides that each pack of cigarettes and
each advertisement for cigarettes must contain one of four warnings. One rea-
son the cigarette-label warnings have largely failed is because of the effective
advertising and marketing by cigarette manufacturers. It can be argued that the
sterile warnings have been weakened and undermined by cigarette overpromo-
tion. In Stevens v. Parke Davis & Co.,'2 5 the drug manufacturer provided a
warning of the risks of Chloromycetin, an antibiotic, on the drug label. How-
ever, Parke Davis then engaged in an elaborate advertising campaign, led by
their "detail men," to persuade medical doctors that the warnings were too se-
vere and should be disregarded. The court held that the injured patient could
recover from Parke Davis because the advertising and overpromotion by Parke
Davis significantly watered down the warnings. Stevens supports the argument
that the cigarette warnings have been undermined by clever and continuous ad-
vertising and marketing."2 6 The point is that the bland and vague federally re-
quired warnings are clearly eclipsed by the inviting and enticing cigarette ads
featuring cowboys, water falls, sports, and attractive young people.
III. THE ABSOLUTE LIABILITY PROPOSAL
The proposal has four parts.127 First, the liability of the cigarette manufac-
turer is absolute. Second, the plaintiff who has regularly smoked one pack of
cigarettes per day for at least fifteen years has a presumption that his or her
cancer was caused by smoking. Third, the damage recovery is limited to four
types of cancer: lung, larynx, oral cavity, and esophagus. The plaintiff must
The tobacco industry is forging new, behind-the-scenes relationships in its effort to fight smoking bans
and excise taxes and polish its image.
The S35 billion-a-year industry has aligned itself with organized labor and black, Hispanic and
women's groups, whose civil rights rhetoric and appeals for social justice have a special resonance in
American life.
Cash and public relations know-how are being lavished on these allies. Tobacco money may buy
anything from scholarships and entertainment to printing and legal services.
Atlanta J.-Const.. May 23, 1988, at C-I. col. 5.
123. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model. 86 COLUM. L REv. 223, 224 (1986) (citations omitted). see also R. POSNER. THE FEDERAL COURTS 271
(1985); Green & Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.
871, 876 (1973).
124. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333-36 (1990).
125. 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973).
126. See supra note 7.
127. Perhaps the first article to mention a no-fault scheme for cigarette caused cancer was Garner, Ciga-
rettes and Welfare Reform,. 26 ENtORY LJ. 269, 314-15 (1977). See also, White, supra note 110, at 589.
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submit a statement from a physician that he has contracted one of the four
types of cancer and that it was probably caused by smoking. Fourth, damages
under the proposal are restricted to medical expenses and lost wages; punitive
damages are not available and there is a $100,000 cap on pain and suffering.
One of the most important aspects of the absolute liability cause of action
is that it does not depend upon advertising, promotion, or warnings by the ciga-
rette manufacturer and will, therefore, not be affected by the preemption deci-
sion.128 Further, since absolute liability has as its fundamental goal the realloca-
tion of losses from non-smokers and the general public onto cigarette
manufacturers and smokers, defenses such as assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, and misuse will not apply.
The proposal would function as follows. John sues A.B.C. (cigarette manu-
facturer) for one or more of the four cancers caused by smoking. The judge
adopts the absolute liability cause of action and sends John's case to the jury.
The only remaining issues for the jury are cause in fact and damages. The only
defense is cause in fact. Since John has claimed that he smoked a brand of
cigarette manufactured by A.B.C. for over fifteen years and a physician has
testified that John's lung cancer was probably caused by smoking, John receives
a presumption that A.B.C. caused his cancer. The presumption shifts the bur-
den of proof to A.B.C. 29 This does not mean that all cases will go to the jury,
nor that the jury verdict will always be for the plaintiff.1 0 For example, the
judge might find, after A.B.C. presents evidence, that there was no evidence
that one of the four types of cancer was present. 13 1 In the recent Galbraith v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. case, for example, the plaintiff lost before the jury
because cause in fact was not proved.1 2 The jury reported that they wanted to
find for the plaintiff, but felt that the attorney had not proved his case. If the
jury agrees with John's case, they may award all reasonable medical expenses
(past, present, and future) as well as lost wages, related to the smoking-caused
cancer. As a matter of fairness and equity, John can not recover punitive dam-
ages. In order to recover punitive damages some form of willfulness must be
shown on the part of the defendant.1 3 Absolute liability rests upon loss reallo-
cation and other social policies.13 4 It does not suggest or imply that the cigarette
manufacturer's conduct was willful. His recovery of pain and suffering would be
limited to a maximum of $100,000."11
128. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
129. See infra notes 176-79.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Galbraith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 144417 (Cal. Super. Ct.. Santa Barbara Co.. Dec. 23.
1985).
133. See Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 103 N.J. 643, 512 A.2d 466 (1986). In order to encourage attor-
neys to bring the first suit in each jurisdiction, however, the judge may want to allow the recovery of punitive
damages if willfulness can be shown.
134. See supra notes 64-95.
135. See O'Connell & Carpenter, Payment for Pain and Suffering Through History, 50 INs. Couts. J. 411
(1983); Zelermyer, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 SYPACUSE L. RtEv. 27 (1955).
Compare with medical malpractice actions: CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West Supp. 1989) places a
$250,000 limit on recoveries for pain and suffering. The statute was held to be constitutional in Fcin v.
Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137. 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985). In Illinois. ILL REV. STAT
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This cap on pain and suffering and the elimination of punitive damages is a
matter of balancing several considerations. The goal is not to bankrupt the ciga-
rette manufacturers-merely force them to pay for the damages caused by their
products. However, experience with the Cipollone. case teaches that the first
case to bring the absolute liability proposal will likely be long, expensive, and
hard-fought. Therefore, for the first case brought in each jurisdiction, in order
to encourage suit and to compensate the attorneys, punitive damages (if willful-
ness is shown) and full pain and suffering should be recoverable. The second
and later suits will not be able to recover punitive damages and will have a cap
of $100,000 on pain and suffering, however.
Because the cause of action is absolute liability, no defenses such as as-
sumption of risk,1 38 contributory negligence, 137 or misuse, 138 are available. The
goal is to create a closed system where the manufacturers and smokers, but not
non-smokers, pay the costs of smoking. Defenses would furnish the cigarette
manufacturers with a means for shifting the loss back to smokers and, through
their insurers, to non-smokers. Insurers who have paid claims to smokers, or on
behalf of smokers, could sue the cigarette manufacturers under absolute liabil-
ity. 39 This would result in lower insurance rates for both non-smokers and
smokers. Equally important, states and governmental entities (such as hospi-
tals), who have made welfare or health care expenditures because of one of the
four listed cancers, could sue and recover their payments from the cigarette
manufacturers under absolute liability.
Each jurisdiction should be able to eliminate the risk of a double recovery
in the case where both the hospital and the smoker sue the cigarette manufac-
turer. If the smoker lacks insurance and has received medical assistance from a
public hospital, then he has paid nothing and only the public hospital would
have an action for the value of the medical treatment provided. If the smoker
has insurance, he will have an action, under the absolute liability proposal, for
the deductables and co-payments he has made, and the insurance carrier will be
able to recover for the medical expenses it has paid to the smoker, the hospital,
or the doctors.
The states could use these millions of recovered dollars to retrain displaced
tobacco farmers and workers in related industries. The funds would also be
available for payment to tobacco farmers who seek welfare. Part of the recov-
ered funds could also be set aside for research into the question of what crops
ch. 70, § 101 placed a $500,000 limit on total recovery, but this act was struck down as violative of the Constitu-
tion in Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Assoc., 63 III. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976). The National Child-
hood Vaccination Injury Act of 1986 caps pain and suffering at $250.000. This involves children with perhaps full
lives to live, not persons often in the last third of their lives. 42 U.S.C.S. Sec. 300 aa-1 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
136. PROSSER & KEETON. supra note 36, at 711-12.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. In order to avoid bringing a lawsuit, smokers with cancer might prefer to recover from their insurers.
The absolute liability proposal gives standing to the insurer to sue for the amount paid to the smoker.
The information on injuries caused to third persons from side stream smoke is still unfolding. The author
takes no position on whether these third parties, or their insurers, should be able to recover under absolute liabil-
ity. "Women who . . . breathe the cigarette smoke of others may be up to three times more likely to develop
cancer of the cervix than other women, a new study suggests." Atlanta J.-Const.. Mar. 17, 1989, at A-5, col. I.
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might be substituted for tobacco. The need for such funds and for research rests
upon the assumption that increased prices for cigarettes (because of absolute
liability) will result in a decrease in demand. 40
During the trial determining whether smoking caused the plaintiff's cancer,
the judge must be alert that the cigarette manufacturer will attempt to win
through superior financial strength. 41 This will be a serious problem both dur-
ing discovery and at trial. The first rule of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides: "These rules . . shall be construed to secure a just, speedy, and inex-
pensive determination of every action."' 42 This means that the judge is bound to
use every technique at his or her disposal to make certain the trial is affordable
to the plaintiff. To insure an economical cigarette-cancer trial, the judge may be
required to limit the scope of discovery or to limit the number or testimony of
witnesses at trial.14 3
IV. THE POLICIES SUPPORTING A MODIFICATION TO CAUSE IN FACT
Until recently, the keystone to tort liability was cause in fact. In order to
recover civil damages, a plaintiff had to prove that his damages were caused in
fact by the act of the defendant. There are two generally accepted tests for
cause in fact. First, the "but for" test. This test is applied by asking whether the
injury would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's conduct."4 If the in-
jury would have occurred in spite of the defendant's act, then the defendant was
not a cause in fact of the injury and there is no liability. Second, the "substan-
tial factor" test." 5 This asks whether the defendant's conduct was a "substan-
tial factor" in bringing about the injury. It admits that there may be numerous
causes of the injury and asks merely was this one a "substantial factor." If the
answer is negative, there can be no liability.
Dean Leon Green has shed light on the cause in fact inquiry by arguing
that cause in fact is a matter of science. 46 Green's test is: Did defendant's
conduct have something to do with the plaintiff's injury as a matter of science?
In most cases, cause in fact is straightforward and creates no problems. For
example, in a fist fight, it may be clear that defendant broke the plaintiff's nose;
or in a car crash, it may be clear that defendant's careless driving caused the
plaintiff's broken leg. Applying Green's test to cancer, the question would be:
did cigarette smoking have something to do with the cancer as a matter of
science.
140. See Cloud, supra note 70, at 762-63.
141. Cigarette manufacturers have grossly inflated the costs of suits:
by resisting all discovery . . . thus requiring a court hearing and order..., by getting confidentiality
orders attached to the discovery materials ..., by taking exceedingly lengthy oral depositions ... and by
gathering . . . every scrap of paper ever generated about a plaintiff, . . . by taking endless depositions of
plaintiffs, expert witnesses . . . by naming multiple experts of their own, . . . [a]nd . . .by taking dozens
...of oral depositions, all across the country . . . in the final days before trial.
Townsley & Hanks, supra note 32, at 277.
142. FED. R. Civ. P. I.
143. See Townsley & Hanks, supra note 32. at 279-84.
144. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 36, at 265-68.
145. Id.
146. See Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REv 543 (1962).
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The courts have not shied away from tough cases in which it was not clear
that the defendant was a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury. These challeng-
ing cases are an admixture of fact and social policy. The best known cause in
fact case is Summers v. Tice,'47 involving three hunters. The two defendants
negligently fired their shotguns in the direction of the plaintiff. One pellet hit
him in the eye. From the facts, the pellet could have been fired from the rifle of
either defendant. Faced with the prospect of letting both escape liability be-
cause the plaintiff could not prove which one was the cause in fact of his injury,
the court held instead that the plaintiff could recover the whole amount from
either defendant:
When we consider the relative position of the parties and the results that would
flow if plaintiff was required to pin the injury on one of the defendants only, a require-
ment that the burden of proof on that subject be shifted to defendants becomes mani-
fest. They are both wrongdoers . . . . They brought about a situation where the negli-
gence of one of them injured the plaintiff, hence it should rest with them each to
absolve himself if he can. The injured party has been placed by defendants in the
unfair position of pointing to which defendant caused the harm. If one can escape the
other may also and plaintiff is remediless ....
[T]he same reasons of policy and justice shift the burden to each of the defend-
ants to absolve himself if he can ....148
More recently, the diethylstilbestrol (DES) cases have forced the courts to
be as far-reaching in regard to cause in fact, as the problems created by the
technology that produced the injury. In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,49 the
best known DES case, the plaintiff's mother took DES in order to prevent a
miscarriage while the plaintiff was in utero. The plaintiff, now an adult, devel-
oped vaginal cancer. From the facts it is clear that her mother could not prove
who manufactured the particular DES that she consumed. The court was faced
with the choice of creating law or dismissing the case. The court held that if the
plaintiff joined the manufacturers of a substantial share of the DES produced,
she could recover from them in proportion to the share of the DES market
represented by the defendants. The court reasoned:
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in science and tech-
nology create fungible goods which may harm consumers and which cannot be traced
to any specific producer. The response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to
prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such products, or to fashion reme-
dies to meet these changing needs ...
From a broader policy standpoint, defendants are better able to bear the cost of
injury . . . "[T]he risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed
among the public as a cost of doing business. "110
The Sindell case was followed, in time, by Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 5 ' a
Wisconsin case. The facts are similar in that the plaintiff developed vaginal
cancer because her mother took DES (while the plaintiff was in utero) and the
plaintiff could not prove who manufactured the particular DES. The Wisconsin
147. 33 Cal. 2d 80. 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
148. Id. at 86-88, 199 P.2d at 4-5.
149. 26 Cal. 3d 588. 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
150. Id. at 510-11. 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
151. 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984).
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Supreme Court rejected the Sindell rule, however, and held that the plaintiff
need only show that her mother consumed the same form of DES (color of pill,
shape) as manufactured by the defendant. Further, rather than recovering a
percentage of her damages as provided in Sindell, the Collins court held that
she could recover all of her damages (except punitives) from the one DES man-
ufacturer. The court reasoned:
Practical considerations favor permitting the plaintiff to proceed . . . against one
defendant. One alternative would be to require the plaintiff, as in Sindell, to join as
defendants "a substantial share" of the producers . ... Another alternative would be
to require the defendant to join a "reasonable number" of possibly liable defendants
.... [E]ither alternative would waste judicial resources by requiring an initial deter-
mination of whether the plaintiff has joined a sufficient number of defendants.
Thus, the plaintiff need commence suit against only one [DES]
defendant .... 152
Summers, Sindell, and Collins make clear that, in contemporary cases in-
volving the outer limits of science, social policy is an important portion of cause
in fact and the court must be as creative as demanded by the facts of the case
and the needs of justice.
Virtually everyone agrees that cigarette smoking causes cancer.153 The
United States Government unequivocally states that: "Cigarette smoking is the
major single cause of cancer mortality in the United States."154 In 1964, the
Surgeon General's Report stated: "Cigarette smoking is causally related to lung
cancer in men . . . . The data for women . . . point in the same direction.' 5 5
More recent studies indicate: "Women's risk of lung cancer has increased by a
factor of four since the early 1960s, when smoking became more popular among
women. In 1986, lung cancer overtook breast cancer as the leading cause of
cancer deaths among women."' 55
Where then is the disagreement in regard to cause in fact and cigarette
smoking? The disagreement emerges as a function of our court system. Pres-
ently, the plaintiff (or her survivor) has the burden of showing that "but for"
smoking the defendant's brand of cigarettes, she would not have been injured.
152. Id. at 193, 342 N.W.2d at 50.
153. See E. WHELAN, supra note I, at 83-87.
Smokers are 10 times more likely to die from lung cancer than nonsmokers. Very heavy smokers (two
packs or more per day) are up to 25 times more likely to die of lung cancer.
Cigarette smoking has been established as a significant cause of cancer of the larynx, oral cavity,
esophagus and bladder, and is significantly associated with cancer of the pancreas and kidney.
E. WHELAN, supra note I, at II.
Compare, "'American Tobacco Co .... is sticking to the hard-line position . . . that lung cancer has not
been scientifically linked to cigarette smoking." Atlanta J.-Const., Jan. 6, 1988, at D-I. col. 2. with "EPA scien-
tists will conclude that smoking is responsible for more than 3,000 cases of lung cancer among non-smokers every
year." Atlanta J.-Const., May 9, 1990, at A-I, col. 4 and "'Dr. Stanton A. Glantz of the University of California
at San Francisco estimated that passive smoke killed 50,000 Americans a year. two-thirds of whom died of heart
disease." N.Y. Times, May 29, 1990, at C-I, col. 3.
154. SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, US. DEP'T OF HEALTH. EDUC. & WELFARE. THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CANCER V (1982).
155. ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE. US. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE. SMOKING AND HEALTH 31 (1964) [hereinafter SMOKING AND HEALTHI.
156. Atlanta J.-Const., Jan. 25, 1990, at A-], col. I.
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At trial, one of the cigarette manufacturers' chief defenses is "other cause."""S
That is, the manufacturer is free to prove that the cause in fact of the plaintiff's
cancer may have been, for example, a food she consumed, the air she breathed,
a pesticide sprayed in her garden, asbestos dust she breathed at work, or an
unexplained hereditary tendency to develop cancer. 158 At trial, the government's
position that cigarettes cause cancer is, at present, not determinative. The issue
is whether smoking was a cause in fact of this plaintiff's particular cancer. The
plaintiff must prove that it was. A presumption is needed to make certain that
in most cases the plaintiff's case will reach the jury. 5' Summers, Sindell, and
Collins support the adoption of a presumption in which the plaintiff has smoked
for fifteen years or more, claims one of the four types of cancer, and a doctor
states that the cancer was likely caused by smoking.
The first cigarette case to be tried in the 1980s, Galbraith v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co.,' 60 highlighted a fundamental problem: people who smoke and die
often have other illnesses that may also have been a cause in fact of death. The
position of the cigarette manufacturers is that they should only pay if the plain-
tiff's death would not have occurred "but for" smoking their brand.,, In Gal-
braith, the jury returned a verdict for the cigarette manufacturer.
The Galbraith trial has obscured the reality of cause in fact: every injury
always has several causes in fact. Over 35 years ago, Dean Leon Green stated:
"There may be and usually are several factors contributing to a plaintiff's hurt,
but it is not required that a defendant's negligence be the only cause of the
hurt. It is enough that the defendant's negligence is a material factor in the
result." 162 For example, consider the case where Sally punches Paul's nose and
breaks it. There are several causes in fact under the "but for" test: Sally's fist,
the weak nature of Paul's nose (perhaps he had broken it, a year ago, playing
football), the bar that served Paul and Sally drinks (both are under the legal
age for consuming alcohol), Sally's mother and father (without them, no Sally),
and Paul's mother and father (ditto). Of course, in most civil cases, these other
causes are not usually raised as cause in fact issues. However, in the recent
cigarette cases, cause in fact has become a cause celebre and every "other
cause" is argued by the manufacturer. For example, two cigarette plaintiff's
attorneys suggest:
157. See Townslcy & Hanks, supra note 32, at 286-91.
158. Id.
159. Townsley and Hanks argue that "Judicial notice should be taken that cigarette smoking can and does
cause lung cancer." Townsley & Hanks, supra note 32, at 285.
Garner, on the other hand, suggests that: "'[A] rebuttable presumption of causation based on long years of
smoking should be established." Garner, supra note 127, at 315. He did not present the policies behind this
concept, nor the impact upon the trial, however.
Rosenberg argues that "courts determine causation under a proportionality rule, which would hold manufac-
turers of toxic agents liable for the proportion of total injuries attributable to their products." Rosenberg, The
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort Systeni, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851
(1984).
160. See Townsley & Hanks, supra note 32, at 296-98.
161. Id.. at 286-91.
162. Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEx. L. REV. 471, 475 (1950). See Rosenberg.
supra note 159, at 851.
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The Big-6 [cigarette manufacturers] contend the "other potential causes" defense
in a lung cancer case justifies discovery of the victim's lifetime stress experiences, all
personality traits, all genetic factors, all environmental exposures during the victim's
lifetime, as well as discovering everything ever taken into his body.
This discovery strategy (if allowed by the trial court . . .) enables a cigarette
manufacturer to scrutinize every minute of a person's life . . . They claim this de-
fense confers the right to scrutinize every school record from kindergarten through
graduate school; every medical record ever made, whether with hospitals, mental insti-
tutions, physicians, pharmacists, insurance companies, or employers. . . . [T]his de-
fense would allow the [cigarette manufacturer] to interrogate everyone the smoker
ever knew ... .163
Proving cause in fact in a cigarette case is expensive. A key tactic in the
recent cigarette trials has been to force the plaintiff's attorneys to spend large
amounts of money. Estimates range from $1.2 million to $3 million in the Ci-
pollone"" case, for example. The defendants forced this expenditure by exten-
sive use of the discovery and trial process:
The . . . cigarette manufacturers, in defending cigarette disease claims, have
adopted strategies to undermine the civil justice system by making the litigation unaf-
fordable and unfair....
The reality for most cigarette disease victims and their families is that they can-
not find a lawyer to handle their cases ....
How can this be? . . . [T]he reason why is simple: they [plaintiffs' attorneys]
cannot afford to. The cigarette manufacturers, through a national team of lawyers,
have adopted a uniform strategy of defense designed to ensure that few lawyers can
afford to take on a cigarette case ....
[A] tobacco industry lawyer . . . [explained]: "To paraphrase General Patton,
the way we won those cases was not by spending all of [R.J.] Reynolds' money, but by
making that other son-of-a-bitch spend all of his."
1 5
Clearly the "spend them to death" tactic by the cigarette manufacturers
has been effective. The high cost of suing a cigarette manufacturer along with
the assumption of risk defense, 68 the "other cause" defense, 167 and statutory
bans,"6 8 has dried up the "new wave" of cigarette litigation.16 9 One cigarette
manufacturer's attorney stated: "[T]he aggressive posture we have taken re-
garding depositions and discovery in general continues to make these cases ex-
tremely burdensome and expensive for plaintiffs' lawyers, particularly sole prac-
titioners.' 70 This use of the civil litigation system raises the question whether
cigarette manufacturers should be able to prevent recoveries merely because of
their financial strength and adroit manipulation of the system.
163. Townsley & Hanks, supra note 32, at 287.
164. See Atlanta J.-Const., June 15, 1988, at A-10, col. 1. See also Rust, supra note 14. at 25.
165. Townsley & Hanks, supra note 32, at 275-78 (footnote omitted).
166. See Crist & Majoras, The "'New" Wave in Smoking and Health Litigation-is Anything Really So
New?. 54 TENN. L. REv. 551, 552-54 (1987).
167. See Townsley & Hanks, supra note 32, at 286-87.
168. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
169. "There are no droves of lawyers handling cigarette disease cases; there is only a handful across the
entire United States. The reality for most cigarette disease victims and their families is that they cannot find a
lawyer to handle their cases, no matter how hard they look.'- Townsley & Hanks, supra note 32, at 276. Compare.
Crist & Majoras. supra note 166, at 602.
170. Townsley & Hanks, supra note 32, at 278.
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V. THE CAUSE IN FACT PROPOSAL
The cause in fact proposal is as follows: a person who proves that he or she
has smoked at least one pack of cigarettes a day for fifteen or more years and
submits a physician's statement that his or her cancer was probably caused by
smoking will receive a presumption that smoking caused his or her cancer.' 7'
The person will only be able to recover damages that result from four types of
cancer: lung, 172 larynx,173 oral cavity, 74 and esophagus,'"7 however.
The effect of giving the smoker a presumption in regard to cause in fact is
to shift the burden of proof on cause in fact to the cigarette manufacturer.76 Of
course, the impact of the cause in fact presumption is that in some cases the
smoker will recover for a cancer whose actual cause is unknown. This is ac-
cepted and is clearly desirable as compared with the present law where no
smoker is able to recover for cigarette-caused cancer. That is, under the abso-
lute liability proposal, the risk of failing to prove causation will be on the ciga-
rette manufacturer rather than the smoker.
A challenging question arises when the cigarette manufacturer introduces
contrary evidence on cause in fact, however. For example, what happens to the
presumption when the cigarette manufacturer presents evidence that the plain-
tiff's cancer was caused by factory smoke or heredity? Traditional evidence law
suggests two possible solutions. First is the Thayer or "bursting bubble" theory:
[T]he only effect of a presumption is to shift the burden of producing evidence
with regard to the presumed fact. If that evidence is produced by the adversary, the
presumption is spent and disappears. In practical terms, the theory means that, al-
though a presumption is available to permit the party relying upon it to survive a
motion for directed verdict at the close of his own case, it has no other value in the
trial.177
However, the "bursting bubble" theory has been criticized because it gives
insufficient weight to presumptions. 78 Numerous courts have rejected the
"bursting bubble" theory and have upgraded the effect of the presumption, for
social policy reasons, as follows:
171. One pack a day for fifteen years for smoking caused cancer was selected because that is a benchmark
employed in cancer research and it is relatively easy to prove. See Advertising of Tobacco Products. Hearings
Before the Subconnittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, H.
of Rep.. 99th Cong.. 2d Sess. 99-167 (1986). See SMOKING AND HEALTH, supra note 155. at too. 106. See U.S.
DLP'T OF HEALTH. EDUC. & WELFARE. THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
RE vIEw. 34. 135-38 (1967) [hereinafter HEALTH CONSEQUENCES].
"There is a rise of about 50 percent in the mortality ratio for those who had smoked 15-35 years. with a
further rise for those smoking longer than 35 years." SMOKING AND HEALTHI. supra note 155. at 90.
A study of Canadian Pensioners found, however: "For cigarette smokers as compared to nonsmokers, overall
mortality ratios were elevated after 5 years of smoking at any time in their life and remained elevated as long as
they continued to smoke cigarettes." HEALTH CONSEQUENCES, supra, at 1I.





176. See E CLEARY. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 968 (3d ed., 1984).
177. Id. at 974.
178. Id. at 975.
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These courts have been unwilling to rely solely upon the natural inferences that
might arise from plaintiff's proof, and instead require more from the defendant in
rebuttal, such as, that his evidence be "uncontradicted, clear, convincing and
unimpeached." Moreover, many courts also hold that the special policies behind the
presumption require that the jury be informed of its existence.17 9
The second is the absolute liability proposal. The absolute liability proposal
adopts the upgraded approach and requires that the cigarette manufacturer's
proof, in rebuttal, be uncontradicted, clear, convincing, unimpeached, and that
the jury be informed of the existence of the cause in fact presumption. The
social policy reasons for this are to create a closed system that reallocates the
loss to the cigarette manufacturer and to balance the financial strength of the
cigarette manufacturer. The fundamental policy is that, as compared to the
non-smoker, the cigarette manufacturer should pay for the health costs of
smoking.
This approach to cause in fact resembles both the concept of judicial notice
and the administrative procedures used in black lung cases. In the 1976
Shimp80 case, "the court took judicial notice of the toxic nature of cigarette
smoke and held that the employer must provide a safe workplace where smok-
ing would not be permitted."'' For coal miners, a rebuttable presumption is
used to determine black lung benefits:
When the coal mine worker is disabled by pneumoconis, the mine operator is
required to pay certain disability benefits. Proof that the individual coal miner's
pneumoconis was caused by working in the coal mine is accomplished by the use of a
rebuttable presumption. After ten years in the mines, the miner's black lung or his
death from a respiratory disease is presumed to be caused by such employment, and
the burden shifts to the operator to rebut the presumption. 1 12
The cause in fact portion of the absolute liability proposal is also similar to
the provisions of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986.183 Under
the Act, a person proves cause in fact if he suffers an injury listed in the Act
and the onset of the injury is within a set period of time after the vaccination. 184
The recovery rests on no-fault liability and is made from a trust fund that is
supported from a tax on vaccines. 8 5
Lung, larynx, oral cavity, and esophagus cancers were selected for compen-
sation because they are the most common forms of smoking-caused cancer.1 86
There is substantial evidence that heart, 87 stomach, 88 and liver disease 8 9 as
179. Id. at 976 (citations omitted).
180. Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (1976).
181. Levin, The Liability of Tobacco Companies - Should Their Ashes Be Kicked?. 29 ARIz. L. REv. 195.
203 (1987).
182. Garner, supra note 127, at 315 (citations omitted).
183. 42 U.S.C.S. § 300aa-I (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
It would be efficient for Congress to develop a compensation program for smokers that resembles the Na-
tional Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986. However, due to the virtual control of Congress by the cigarette
manufacturers, this will not likely occur. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
184. Id. at § 300aa-ll(c)(l).
185. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, 26 U.S.C.S. § 9510(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
186. See supra notes 172-75.
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well as other serious illnesses' 9° are also caused by smoking. If the proposal is
adopted, these other serious diseases can be considered for later addition. One
pack a day was selected as the threshold because it is simple to identify and
relatively easy to prove. Researchers tend to use one pack a day as the pivot
point for cancer caused by smoking.' 91 Fifteen years of smoking was selected as
the minimum because that is, in general, when the four compensable cancers
begin to appear.192 Of course, if the plaintiff smokes for less than fifteen years
or smokes less than a pack each day, there is no recovery under the proposal.
The plaintiff, in that case, would be left to a traditional suit. The absolute liabil-
ity proposal seeks a balance in regard to fairness. The smoker can only recover
for one or more of the four cancers because the cigarette manufacturer is sub-
ject to absolute liability. If the plaintiff suffers cancer in another part of the
body, he or she must bring a traditional suit.
One problem that will arise under the proposal is what happens if during
the fifteen year period the plaintiff smoked numerous brands of cigarettes. Who
pays? To answer this we must consider the underlying policies of placing the
loss upon the cigarette manufacturer. 9 3 There are several approaches. First, in
order to recover, the plaintiff could file a claim against all of the manufacturers
who produced the brands he smoked. They would be treated as joint tortfeasors,
each one liable for the whole amount.' 94 The plaintiff could elect against whom
to enforce the judgment. 95 Second, the plaintiff could file a suit against the
manufacturer whose brand he smoked over fifty percent of the time. 9' The
manufacturer could, of course, join other cigarette manufacturers.' 97
Third, the smoker or his representative could sue and recover from a ciga-
rette manufacturer whose brand was smoked enough to be a "substantial fac-
tor" in the smoker's cancer. 98 Finally, the plaintiff would be required to join in
his action the cigarette manufacturers who, when added together, had produced
a substantial share of the cigarettes he smoked. 9
A critique of these solutions is that a cigarette manufacturer will be obli-
gated to pay damages because the plaintiff smoked the defendant's brand only
some of the time during the fifteen years prior to contracting cancer. The an-
swer is that the loss should rest on the manufacturer and smokers. With a large
number of claims each year, it is likely that each manufacturer will pay its fair
share. For example, the judge in the Collins DES case stated:
190. See id.
191. See supra note 171.
192. See supra note 171.
193. See supra notes 64-95.
194. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 36, at 324-30. See Rosenberg, supra note 159.
195. See Id. at 330-32.
196. Fifty percent was selected because it is easy to prove. Smokers would know which brand they smoke
most of the time or fifty percent of the time. However, under this requirement, if he smoked three different brands
equally, he could not sue under absolute liability.
197. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132.
198. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 36, at 267-68.
199. Compare Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, and Rosenberg, supra note 159.
1991]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Each defendant contributed to the risk of injury to the public and, consequently,
the risk of injury to individual plaintiffs such as Therese Collins. Thus each defendant
shares, in some measure, a degree of culpability in producing or marketing ....
[T]he drug company is in a better position to absorb the cost of the injury. The drug
company can either insure itself against liability, absorb the damage award, or pass
the cost along to the consuming public as a cost of doing business. 00
Article I of the United States Constitution provides: "All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . ." Be-
cause of Article I, it may be suggested that to the extent the proposal adopts
absolute liability and modifies cause in fact, it is an unconstitutional usurpation
of the congressional power to make law. There are several responses to this
argument.
First, the courts through the common law have traditionally dealt with per-
sonal injury suits.2"' The courts have charted the common law, as needed, in
cases involving personal injury. Many of the concepts originally developed by
these courts have been far reaching: strict liability,202 negligence,20 3 cause in
fact,20 4 proximate cause,20 5 governmental immunity,206 family immunity, 207 con-
tributory negligence, 208 assumption of risk,20 9 and comparative fault. 210 The ab-
solute liability proposal, then, is mere accretion, the incremental extension of
personal injury law. This reasoning also applies at the state level. Indeed, since
each state legislature retains full authority to supercede a judicial decision
adopting the absolute liability proposal, it can scarcely be argued that the power
of the legislature to make law has been usurped.21'
Second, although the proposal expands substantive law, it does so in a fa-
miliar and a foreseeable manner. The legal and economic impact of smokers'
suits against cigarette manufacturers has been debated since 1954. 2 12 To be
sure, absolute liability is the historical foundation of tort law and has been with
200. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 191-92, 342 N.W.2d at 49 (citations omitted).
201. "In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in science and technology create fungible
goods which may harm consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific producer. The response of the courts
can be either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such products, or to fashion
remedies to meet these changing needs .... " Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
202. See F. VANDALL, supra note 53, at 1-16.
203. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 36, at 163.
204. See id. at 263-68.
205. See id. at 263-321.
206. See id. at 1032-56.
207. See id. at 904-07.
208. See id. at 451-62.
209. See id. at 480-98.
210. See id. at 469-80.
211. For example, strict liability was held to apply to blood infected with hepatitis in Cunningham v. Mac-
Neal Memorial Hoasp., 47 I11. 2d 443. 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970). However that decision was soon overruled by the
Illinois legislature. ILL. ANN. STAT., Ch. III , 9 5102 (1977).
212. See supra note 30. "[In] the Lartigue case, filed in Louisiana in 1958, Frank Lartigue ... died of lung
cancer in 1955. His widow filed a $779,500 suit. ., against the companies whose tobacco products Mr. Lartigue
had smoked: R.J. Reynolds and Liggett and Myers." E. WHELAN, Supra note I, at 155.
'[T]he longer term outlook for this cash-rich [cigarette] industry is clouded by a growing anti-smoking move-
ment that is sweeping the nation. The uncertainties include a mountain of health-related litigation against ciga-
rette manufacturers and bills to restrict smoking in public places and to double cigarette excise taxes." Atlanta J.-
Const.. Feb. 15, 1987, at E-1. col. 2.
[Vol. 52:405
THE COSTS OF SMOKING
us since, at least, 1466.213 Cause in fact has been under metamorphosis since
1948.214 Like many "new" cars, the absolute liability proposal merely draws
existing components together into a functional package. In response to the
problems reflected in Cipollone15 and other recent cases,216 absolute liability
suggests a foundational concept to fill a contemporary need: the reallocation of
losses in cigarette-caused cancer cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the absolute liability proposal, a person with cancer who has smoked
for at least 15 years is able to recover lost wages, medical expenses, and up to
$100,000 for pain and suffering. Preemption by the Cigarette Labeling and Ad-
vertising Act is not a defense. Indeed, the only defense is that cigarette smoke
did not cause the lung, larynx, oral cavity, or esophagus cancer. To assist the
plaintiff to recover, he or she is given a strong presumption that smoking did in
fact cause the cancer. A goal of the proposal is to reallocate the costs of smok-
ing from the shoulders of non-smokers to the shoulders of the cigarette manu-
facturers and indirectly, through higher costs, also to the shoulders of the smok-
ers. If there is a resulting reallocation of resources in the cigarette industry, this
is to be preferred to the present imbalance where all of the loss is borne by non-
smokers, insurance companies, public hospitals, and public health care profes-
sionals. The clear message from 37 years of cigarette litigation failures is that a
fundamental change is needed, one that places the loss on the cigarette manu-
facturer: absolute liability.
213. Anonymous. Y.B. 5 Edw. 4, f. 7. pl. 18 (K.B. 1466).
214. See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d I.
215. See Cipollone, 893 F.2d 541.
216. See supra cases cited in note 52.
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